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Who is the goddess, or whose the god, of modernity’s political theology?  To pose this 
question in this way, to pose the question of the goddess, at the outset opens up the question 
of the God as the unity of any political theology.  Since the goddess is not the god, and yet 
she does not stand as his opposite.  She shows up that he is, or at least was once, plural, and if 
she is not, or is not now, his claim to be one, or the claim staked on his demise and the 
absence that would succeed him, is a historical claim.  She was, and he was many, before he, 
and his death, were at one.  And even Hegel, that triumphant thinker of a rational 
monotheism, acknowledges the place of a state goddess at Athens, the Volksgeist which he 
says is at the same “the self knowing and willing divine”.1 
To intrude the goddess and let her constitute the first of our introductory questions 
sets her in opposition to the God-or-godlessness of modernity: this unifying singular purpose, 
the pressing of a metaphysical unity, of the political in the present age.   For the historical 
setting of modernity’s politics has unfolded in the site that opens up between modernity’s 
God and its avowed godlessness, and more than one commentator has grounded modernity’s 
                                                
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §257, p. 398.  “Der Volksgeist 
(Athene) das sich wissende und wollende Göttliche” (Hegel’s emphases). 
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secular ambitions in the secularisation of a divine history, and made of, and so interpreted, 
this godlessness the God this godlessness was meant to supplant.  Whether you are 
committed to God, or to his extermination from the public realm (even as you might hold to 
him in private), what has unified the political realm has been the place occupied either by the 
divine God of reason or by his forcible evacuation in the name of an infinitely rational 
humanity.  Not for nothing did Heidegger first interpret Hegel not as an ontotheology, but as 
onto-ego-theology, and so showed how the theos as ontōs on was to be understood, in Hegel 
and in all that followed in the end and completion of metaphysics, through the ego, the ‘Ich 
denke als Ich stelle her’ of Hegel’s account of subjectivity’s infinite movement, the putting 
into position, of absolute subjectivity.  At bottom, what unites these two seemingly opposed 
positions – the counterpositions of an Hegelian or a Marxist politics – is the question of the 
ground of the political itself.  It is this, here, that is the preoccupation with this God and his 
self-evacuated site, that presents itself as the ground, the unifying essence, of the political. 
 Nothing exemplifies the definition of this ground and its connection with a political 
theology with more startling effect than Eduard Gans’s attribution to Hegel of the 
extraordinary claim that “the state is Geist itself, which exists in the world and realises itself 
as such through consciousness . . . it is the path of God through the world . . . the force of 
reason actualising itself as will”.2 
 This unifying essence, the ground of the political, is at the same time the way in 
which the ground of the political has made its presence felt as an historical presence, and this 
in two senses: both in the sense that this ground is itself a history, and in the sense that the 
drive to occupy this ground is the history of the politics through which we have lived.  It is 
here that writers and historians have identified, in the words one of them, the “sacred causes” 
in the analysis of “religion and politics from the European dictators to Al Qaeda”.3  It is for 
the sake of this ground that Carl Schmitt wrote, beginning with his 1932 Der Begriff des 
Politischen.4  It is for the sake of understanding this ground that Schmitt was to declare that 
“through the liberalism of the last hundred years all political concepts have been altered and 
denatured in a peculiar and systematic way”.5 In 1933 Schmitt had noted, against the 
                                                
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, p. 403.  “Der Staat ist der Geist, der in der Welt steht 
und sich in derselben mit Bewußtsein realisiert . . . es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt . . . sein Grund ist die 
Gewalt der sich als Wille verwirklichenden Vernunft.”  (Gans’ reported emphasis)   
3 Cf. Michael Burleigh, Sacred Causes: Religion and Politics from the European Dictators to Al Qaeda 
(London: Harper Press, 2006). 
4 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1932).  
5 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 55.  “Durch den Liberalismus des letzten Jahrhunderts sind alle 
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‘liberalism’ of Hegel and Marx: “Only when the Reichspräsident, on the 30th January 1933, 
named the leader of the National-Socialist movement, Adolf Hitler, as the German 
Chancellor, did the German Reich recover a political leadership, and the German state find 
the strength to annihilate Marxism, as the enemy of the state.  . . .  On this day, one might 
thus say, ‘Hegel died’.” 6  This is because “the political unity of the present [Nazi] state is a 
tripartite summation of state, movement and people.  It differs from the ground up from the 
liberal-democratic state schema that has come to us from the nineteenth century”.7 
 Our second, introductory question then asks: ‘how does Schmitt’s tripartite unity 
differ?’  And yet our first question still presses in, since the goddess sits in opposition to the 
god or his absence, fulfilled in the subjectivity of the subject.  Does Schmitt’s tripartite unity 
stand in opposition to liberalism’s absolute subjectivity, or is ‘state, movement and people’ 
simply another way of naming how through movement the person of the people comes to be 
the state?  That state and person, aggregated and so swept up in movement as ‘people’, names 
the one and the same as liberalism names, the origin of the political in the state? 
 Does asking after the goddess, even were she merely to appear as a second divinity to 
the first, succeed in letting us ask, is the god, was the god always, nothing other than the 
summation, the summary unity, of the divine underpinning of the state? 
 Does Schmitt succeed in overcoming the nineteenth-century liberalisation of the 
state?  After his own disastrous adventure with the Nazi State, and following his resignation 
from the Rectorate of Freiburg University, Martin Heidegger is reported as beginning a 
seminar on Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie in saying “It was said Hegel died in 1933: on the 
contrary, he has only just begun to live”.8  In his preparatory notes for this seminar, 
Heidegger says with direct reference to Schmitt, “Carl Schmitt thinks as a liberal”.9  He 
provides two reasons for why he thinks of Schmitt in this way: (1) because Schmitt thinks of 
the political merely as only ‘also’ a sphere – we infer, of being (and so just one among 
others), and so (2) in other words Schmitt thinks liberally because he is unable to think the 
                                                                                                                                                  
politischen Vorstellungen in einer eigenartigen und systematischen Weise verändert und denaturiert worden.” 
6 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 31 f.  “Erst als der Reichspräsident am 30. Januar 1933, den Führer 
der Nationalsozialistischen Bewegung, Adolf Hitler, zum Reichskanzler ernannte, erhielt das Deutsche Reich 
wieder eine politische Führung und fand der deutsche Staat die Kraft, den staatsfeindlichen Marxismus zu 
vernichten. [. . .] An diesem Tage ist demnach, so kann man sagen, ‘Hegel gestorben’.”   
7 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 11 f.  “Die politische Einheit des gegenwärtigen Staates ist eine 
dreigliedrige Zusammenhang von Staat, Bewegung, Volk.  Sie unterschiedet sich von dem aus dem 19. 
Jahrhundert übernommenen liberal-demokratischen Staatsschema von Grund auf.” 
8 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 606.  “Man hat gesagt, 1933 ist Hegel gestorben; 
im Gegenteil: er hat erst angefangen zu leben.” 
9 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 174.  “Carl Schmitt denkt liberal.” 
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political as the very ground of being (i.e. through the being of beings), Schmitt  is unable to 
think, as even Aristotle (for Heidegger) was able, of the human animal as the political animal 
(ζῷον πολιτικόν).10  Schmitt can only ground the being of the human being in the state, and 
not in being itself.  This, as Heidegger makes explicit in his notes, is to follow Hegel.  With 
reference to the friend/enemy distinction, Heidegger argues that to ground the political in the 
state is to fail to ground the political in the manner in which the state unfolds, namely in its 
unfolding – “die Weise in der er west! (Sein!)”, thus Schmitt is only able to ground the 
political metaphysically, just as Hegel does, in a self-unfolding self-assertion, out of which 
the friend/enemy distinction appears.11 
 Heidegger’s argument is that the self-unfolding self-assertion of the self that comes to 
the fore both in Hegel and in the friend/enemy distinction is neither interpreted from out of 
the originary being and unfolding of the self, nor able to provide a passage into this originary 
unfolding, and so, he concludes, is “just typically – liberal!”.12 
 How does Schmitt think the friend/enemy distinction fundamentally or originally?  
Schmitt says “enemy is not the concurrent or the counterpart in general”, adding that the 
enemy is what we discover when entire bodies of humanity face each other in enmity, and 
concluding, “enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the wider sense; πολέµος, not ἐχθρός” (“enemy 
is the hostile army, not the individual foe in the wider sense; battle, not hatred”).13  
Heidegger’s conclusion from this is that because bodies of humanity constitute – in the wider 
sense – ‘the political’ and battle is ordinarily enjoined between states or between bodies that 
oppose each other in the name of a communality (thus, perhaps, from the Crusaders to Boko 
Haram, in the name of a religion or of an already shared shared interpretation of one), then 
Schmitt’s concept of the political is, strictly speaking (from the point of view of Innenpolitik 
or ‘domestic politics’, “already [the] determining of the other as friend”.  To put this most 
clearly: the determination of the other as friend is more basic than the determination of the 
other as foe because the other as foe only appears at the point where there is an already 
determined entirety (Schmitt’s word is Gesamtheit) who are in friendship. 
 Heidegger’s claim against Schmitt is that he thinks as a liberal.  This means he is 
unable to think beyond and outside the province of the political laid out in the metaphysics 
                                                
10 Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, 1242 a 23; Politics 1253 a 3–8, 1278 b 19. 
11 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 173. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 173.  “– vielmehr typisch – liberal!” 
13 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 16.  “Feind ist also nicht der Konkurrent oder der Gegner im 
Allgemeinen. [. . .]  Feind ist hostis nicht inimicus im weiteren Sinne; πολέµος, nicht ἐχθρός.” 
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that Hegel describes, a metaphysics that sets in place all that follows – in Marx, in Nietzsche, 
through the historical experiences of socialism, Marxism, fascism, Nazism, Americanism and 
even what Heidegger later calls World Democracy.  How is this so?  A little later in his 
preparatory notes for the seminar on Hegel, Heidegger makes a citation of Hegel but gives no 
provenance for it (and nor do the editors): “thus is the will power in its self and the essence of 
universal power, of nature and of Geist”.14  The citation is from Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History,15 and in the question of Schmitt, the citation Heidegger himself 
makes does not help us in to the critique.  The importance of this citation, to which Heidegger 
alludes and refers but which he does not quote in full, and which concerns the friend/enemy 
distinction, comes under the consideration of the essence of the state, and says: 
This essence can come to be thought as ‘the Lord’, the Lord of nature and of Geist.  
This subject, however, the Lord, is itself only something which is one among others.  
The absolute power is not Lord over others, but Lord over itself, reflexion within 
itself, personality.16 
 
What this says is that the essential coming to be of the individual as a taking power or 
lordship of the self over the self is the constitution of the self both as, and within, the state.  
This is not other than Schmitt’s basic determination of the self as being ‘in friendship’ for the 
sake of the state: the coming to be of the self, as not over against others but as lordship over 
the self, comes most fully to be in the state, as the already-present, as most basic principle of 
the state.  Lordship, as an essential name of the God.  The Lord.  God. 
 How does the Lord, the god, stand in relation to the question of who the goddess 
might be?  Into this analysis of friend and foe, and of the state as the basic constitution of 
friendship and lordship over the self, Heidegger introduces a single word: Mitsein.  Mitsein, – 
co-being (as the basic determination of Dasein, here-being), is for Heidegger nothing other 
than a well-known Greek word σύνειµι, which says the same as Mitsein, co-being.  How is 
co-being,  σύνειµι, and what is its essential connection with the state? 
 Liberalism (for Heidegger) says that co-being, σύνειµι, is constituted by the terminus, 
                                                
14 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 173.  “So ist der Wille Macht an ihm selbst und 
das Wesen allgemeiner Macht, der Natur und des Geistes.” 
15 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, vol. 1, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994 [1931]), p. 113.  “So ist der Wille Macht an ihm selbst und das Wesen 
allgemeiner Macht, der Natur und des Geistes.” 
16 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, vol. 1, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994 [1931]), p. 113.  “Dies Wesen kann etwa gedacht werden als ‘der Herr’, der Herr 
der Natur und des Geistes. Dieses Subjekt aber, der Herr, ist selbst nur etwas, das noch gegen anderes ist. Die 
Macht als absolute ist dagegen nicht Herr über ein anderes, sondern Herr über sich selbst, Reflexion in sich 
selbst, Persönlichkeit.” 
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the principle, of the state.  The state is the political possibility of that lordship over the self 
which is simultaneously lord over all and lord over that which has fully become itself, within 
the state: thus absolute subjectivity, either as God as such or in place of God.  The state, as 
the material effect of Selbständigkeit and absolute subjectivity, having fully become what it 
is, stands over against others in at least potential πολέµος. 
 If Heidegger thinks that liberalism as such, either as what we have come today to call 
a ‘political theology’ is a name of the impasse of our present inability to proceed beyond the 
subjectivity of the subject, a subjectivity which functions as a ground for the material self 
presence of the self in its coming to be as the state, why is ‘being’, das Seyn or das Sein not 
itself a ground, a metaphysical principle that is itself not other than a name or placeholder 
either for god or his displacement?  Can, and how can, the goddess come to our aid? 
 Heidegger poses a contrary to this understanding of liberalism that he finds at work 
after Hegel and as much at work in Schmitt – within the field, derived from the analysis of 
Sein und Zeit from where the notion of Mitsein also made its first published appearance, of 
care – die Sorge.  Here Heidegger introduces his most basis determination of being, das Seyn.  
Heidegger asks “from where does this ‘contrary’ have its essential origin?  From this, that be-
ing is historically being-in-the-world – as self-willing – a with- and against-willing”.17  This 
with- and against-willing functions in these notes as a name for what Heidegger believes 
liberalism – Hegel’s metaphysics as a ‘politics’, as ‘the political’ is unable sufficiently to 
ground, namely becoming itself.  Twice in the notes Heidegger draws attention to how, both 
for Schmitt and for Hegel willing, the will as such, is to be understood as “itself–self–
becoming-willing”.18  Why becoming is to be understood metaphysically as willing, not 
much more is said in these essentially private notes. 
 In a text whose importance is yet fully to be realised, however, known in English as 
The Anaximander Fragment, first written in 1946 and published in 1950, whose central lines 
were worked out in a much larger set of undelivered lectures prepared in 1942, something 
more fundamental is said, which allows us – within  the time allotted – to glimpse why 
Heidegger could not possibly have understood any form of ‘being’ to function either as a 
covert name for, or a name for the evacuation of, the god.  Central to Heidegger’s 
                                                
17 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 173.  “Wodurch hat der ‘Gegensatz’ seinem 
Wesensursprung?  Dadurch, daß Seyn geschichtliches In-der-Welt-sein – als Sichwollen – ein Mit- und 
Widerwollen ist”  (Heidegger’s emphases). 
18 Martin Heidegger, Seminare: Hegel – Schelling (GA86), p. 174, 180.  “Das Sich-selbst-werden-wollen”; “Der 
Wille . . . das Sich selbst-(Wesen)-werden” (Heidegger’s emphases). 
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interpretation of the Anaximander fragment is his presentation of how becoming, das Werden 
is thought as an opposition to being in all metaphysical thinking, from Plato to Hegel and 
Nietzsche, and this means in Schmitt as well, insofar as Schmitt is unable to break out of the 
liberal metaphysics of ‘the political’. 
 In order to draw our conclusion today, and because this is a conference about Schmitt 
and not about Heidegger, we can do no more than present in the briefest outline why 
Heidegger thinks that Schmitt is unable to break out beyond Hegel’s concept of ‘the 
political’.  In the course of this interpretation of Anaximander Heidegger seeks to think being 
in terms of the pair, presence/presencing: in other words, to think being and becoming 
together.  This is at the same time to think being historically: which means as the pair 
presence/presencing is itself historically brought to speech by Anaximander and by our 
interpreting of him.  We think historically not only because through the unfolding of the pair 
presence/presencing, history occurs, but also because historically this is how we have 
experienced the unfolding of the pair presence/presencing. 
 How, in just a few words, does Heidegger explain this presencing?  He says that what 
presences belongs in the oneness of all that belongs together in presencing.  This he calls die 
Fuge, ‘the jointure’.  Whatever is joined in jointure is what needs no other underpinning than 
its belonging together in being joined, like a perfect dovetail joint of a wooden cabinet.  But 
jointure, die Fuge, is a lingering in between what Heidegger calls a twofold absence: thus it 
both lingers and it presses and obtrudes into the here of its coming and the away of its going, 
and it may insist on seeking to be more present, to persevere in its presencing.  Heidegger 
says “it strikes the wilful pose of persistence”.19  We see immediately the parallel with the 
text of 1934.  Heidegger is not speaking of luminous objects, but of beings, people, in the 
πόλις.  He stresses that what comes to presence – and this means also who – lingers awhile 
not in jointure, but in un-jointure.  Un-jointure, die Un-fuge is, he says more basic that 
jointure.  Or rather he names die Un-fuge with its Greek name, in the context of the Greek 
name of being as a whole and in itself, ἐόντα.  The Greek name of die Un-fuge is ἀδικία.  
Thus, the Anaximander fragment “speaks out of the essential experience, that ἀδικία itself is 
the basic trait of this ἐόντα”.20 
 Disjointure and jointure are the most basic traits of Mitsein, of σύνειµι, of our co-
                                                
19 Martin Heidegger, Der Spruch des Anaximander (GA5), p. 355.  “Es spreizt sich in den Eigensinn des 
Beharrens auf.” 
20 Martin Heidegger, Der Spruch des Anaximander (GA5), p. 355.  “Er spricht aus der Wesenserfahrung, daß 
die ἀδικία der Grundzug der ἐόντα ist.” 
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presencing as our being together.  This is not a principle, but an experience.  Of these basic 
traits, disjointure, disorder, is the more basic, which means only that it appears first, in order 
that jointure, order, friendship, being-set-in-peace-and-freedom can arise.  Jointure arises 
within the πόλις inasmuch as it is ordered within and to and for and in itself.  What is the 
Greek name of jointure?  Δίκη is the Greek name of die Fuge, jointure, order, the fitting.  
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